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IS COAL INCLUDED IN A GRANT OR RESERVATION
OF "OIL, GAS, OR OTHER MINERALS"?
by
Barksdale Hortenstine
We Americans consume more fuel than we produce. We have
become increasingly dependent upon foreign oil-a dependency which
has an impact not only upon our domestic economy but our balance
of payments position as well. We must respond, now.'
Due largely to an accelerating demand and a declining production of
domestic oil and gas, the formerly strong energy position of the United States
has deteriorated greatly. As a result, the United States faces an energy
problem of unprecedented proportions. 2  This energy crisis has led to an
awareness by the American public of the nation's dependence upon energy,
a realization that the only guarantee for an uninterrupted supply of energy is
the ownership of energy resources, and an interest in alternative domestic
fuels which can be quickly developed to make up for the oil shortfall. The
most suitable alternative resource in the short term is coal, and this in turn
has led to a renewal of interest in the rich supply of both lignite and
bituminous coal in the State of Texas.3
1. Address by Treasury Secretary William Simon, National Press Club, Feb. 5,
1974.
2. In 1972 72 quadrillion (72 x 1015) British Thermal Units (Btu) of en-
ergy were consumed in the United States. That amount was 50% more
than a decade previous and twice the consumption of 20 years ago. By
1980 the level of consumption is projected to be one-third higher than
today. Estimates by the U.S. Bureau of Mines show that consumption in
the year 2000 will be more than 2.6 times that of 1972. In addition to
the overall increase in level of consumption per capita consumption of
energy has increased 44% in the past 20 years.
W. KAISER, TEXAS LIGNITE: NEAR-SURFACE AND DEEP-BASIN RESOURCES 2 (1974).
3. The near-surface resources of Texas lignite alone are estimated at 10 to 20 bil-
lion tons. Approximately one million acres are underlain by lignites at depths of less
than 200 feet. The deep-basin resources at depths of 200 to 5,000 feet below the surface
are estimated at well in excess of 100 billion tons, which is equivalent on a Btu basis
to 277 billion barrels of oil. This is an energy equivalent of approximately twenty times
the current proven oil reserves of Texas, or about sixteen times the present proven nat-
ural gas reserves in the state. Statewide production of lignite is currently estimated at
8 to 10 million short tons annually. When additional lignite-fueled, steam-electric plants
are operational by 1980, production is expected to be about 25 million tons annually.
Texas at that time will rank among the top ten coal-producing states in the nation.
Lignite is a "low rank, brownish black coal with a high moisture and volatile matter
content and a heating value of less than 8300 BTU/16, that is intermediate in coalifi-
cation between peat and subbituminous coal. Most lignite contains clearly separable
pieces of plant material, is soft, friable and comparatively porous, and has a low specific
gravity." Id. at 3. It is a result of this lower Btu heating value that lignite offers more
potential as an alternate energy resource than other types of coal. Id.
Bituminous coal is:
[Olne rank in a spectrum of coal varieties based on degree of metamor-
phism or coalification. Commonly recognized ranks of coal, in increasing
degree of metamorphism are: (1) lignite (2) subbituminous (3) bitu-
minous (4) semibituminous (5) semianthracite and (6) anthracite. Bu-
tuminous coal contains fixed carbon of 86 percent or less, volatile matter
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As a result of this increasing demand the question of ownership of coal
when there has been a grant or reservation of "oil, gas, and other minerals"
is becoming extremely significant. 4  The words "other minerals" mean
different things to different people. ' The technical definition of "minerals"
found in the dictionary is ",[a]ny naturally occurring, homogeneous inorganic
substance having a definite chemical composition and characteristic crystal-
line structure, color, and hardness." 6  The legal definition of "minerals" as
"[a]ny natural substance having sufficient value to be mined, quarried, or
extracted for its own sake or its own specific use"7 is obviously quite distinct
from the technical definition. The mining industry long ago defined the
term as including all the substances on the earth's crust which are sought for
and removed by man for the substance itself.8  In the latter part of the last
century the Land Department of the United States determined "minerals" to
encompass any substance which, when found in quantity and quality, renders
land sought to be patented more valuable than it would be if used for
agriculture. 9 The foregoing enumeration is not an exhaustive list of the
valid definitions of "minerals," but an illustration of the broad sweep of the
term and the problems inherent in interpreting it.
I. THE TEXAS INTERPRETATION OF "OTHER MINERALS"
A. Rules of Interpretation
The determination of the ownership of coal when a conveyance of "oil,
gas, and other minerals" in a deed or a lease is involved will depend upon the
meaning the court attributes to the words "other minerals." Certain funda-
mental principles of interpretation are essential to this determination.
of 14 percent or more, and heating values of 11,000 or more BTUs per
pound of coal.
T. EVANS, BITUMINOUS COAL IN TEXAS 3 (1974).
4. This conveyance can be found in wills, mineral deeds, and mineral leases.
Practically speaking, however, the crux of the problem is concerned with conveyances
of "oil, gas, and other minerals" found in ancient deeds and wills since most of the old
mineral leases have expired except as to oil and gas production. The new deeds and
leases specifically delineate the minerals conveyed due to the awareness of the problem.
5. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903). The United
States Supreme Court stated, "The word 'mineral' is used in so many senses, dependent
upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the dictionary throw but little light
upon its significance in a given case." Id. at 530.
6. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 835 (lst ed.
1969). It is necessary to point out that under this definition oil and gas are technically
not "minerals" for they as well as coal are products of organic rather than inorganic
processes. This technical restriction, however, has not stopped the courts from cate-
gorizing oil and gas as a "mineral." See Warner v. Patton, 19 S.W.2d 1111 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1929, writ ref'd); Luse v. Parmer, 221 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1920, writ ref'd); Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1919, writ ref'd). See also H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw, MANUAL
OF TERMS 261 (1971), where it is stated: "Although scientifically this term [mineral]
refers to a chemical element or compound occurring naturally as a product of inorganic
processes, it has been broadened colloquially in the oil, gas and coal extractive industries
to include these products of organic processes."
7. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (1969).
8. 1 W. SNYDER, MINES AND MINING 114 (1902).
9. Comm'r Drummond Circular Gen. Land Office, July 15, 1873, as cited in 1 W.
SNYDER, supra note 8, at 115 n.3.
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The judicial function in a deed controversy is to give effect to the intent of
the parties. 10 Consequently, the meaning of the term "other minerals" is in
significant part dependent upon what the words meant to the parties rather
than any legal or technical meaning." The intent of the parties must, if
possible, be gathered from the language used in the instrument submitted to
construction.' 2 The intent of the parties as evidenced by the language used
within the four corners of the instrument will in turn depend upon the
meaning attributed to those words. Since the court is limited to the four
corners of the instrument, the meaning attributed to the words must be
determined by some objective standard. The standard used to determine the
meaning of words in a deed is the popular standard or the normal sense of
the words in the community.1 3  Once ascertained by application of this
standard, the meaning will be given effect and no extrinsic evidence will be
allowed to show that the parties intended a contrary meaning. 14  It must be
emphasized that the court may consider evidence peculiar to the particular
minerals in question to determine if that substance was intended to be
included in the term as used in the deed.' 5  For this process of interpreta-
tion the parol evidence rule does not exclude extrinsic evidence. 16 The rule
operates only after meaning is established to prevent proof that something
was intended or agreed upon which the writing does not express.' 7 The
term "other minerals," therefore, does not have to be shown to be ambiguous
for the court to consider evidence of exceptional characteristics, unique
value, method of extraction, and other particular characteristics of the
substances in question.
The rule of "plain meaning" has other qualifications. First, the intent of
the parties (or the meaning of the words) is to be ascertained by a reading
of the instrument as a whole.' 8  Thus, if other words appear in the
instrument which show that the parties intended a word to mean something
10. 2 R. DEVLIN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND DEEDS §§ 835, 836 (3d ed.
1911).
11. 1 E. KUNTZ, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 16.1 (1962).
12. 3 A. CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.89 (1952).
13. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2458, 2463 (3d ed. 1940).
14. 2 R. DEVLIN, supra note 10, § 836.
15. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 579 (1951). See also Young, Parol Evidence and
Texas Deeds: Some Current Problems, 34 TExAs L. REV. 351 (1956). This point is
of utmost importance when a court considers extrinsic evidence of characteristics of the
particular minerals in question to determine whether it was the intent of the parties to
include them in a grant or reservation of "minerals," but also says that the term "miner-
als" is not ambiguous. See, e.g., Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1975, no writ), where the court stated that the deed in question was not ambig-
uous and refused to consider surrounding circumstances for explanation of the intention
of the parties. The court allowed evidence of the method of extraction necessary for
production of the coal, however, and refused to hold that coal passed under the convey-
ance because the method destroyed the surface estate. The court reasoned that it would
not be the intention of the original grantor to convey a mineral the extraction of which
would destroy the surface owner's estate. Allowance of this evidence might appear er-
roneous to one unaware of the distinction between allowing extrinsic evidence as a
means of interpretation and allowing extrinsic evidence as a result of an ambiguity. For
further explanation, see Comment, Surface or Mineral: A Single Test?, 23 BAYLOR L.
REV. 407, 409 n.8 (1971).
16. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 579.
17. Id.
18. 2 R. DEVLIN, supra note 10, § 844a.
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less than the popular meaning, then the limited meaning will be given effect.
Secondly, if two conflicting intentions are expressed and the meaning of the
instrument is deemed ambiguous, then various aids of construction are
utilized in arriving at the intent of the parties. 19
Based upon these principles of interpretation, there are three instances
when substances such as coal, normally construed to be "minerals," would
not be included in a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals": (1) when
the particular characteristics of the substance in question indicate that these
substances would not be included in the popular meaning of "minerals"; (2)
when other language in the deed shows that the parties meant to limit the
popular meaning of "mineral"; and (3) when due to a determination of
ambiguity by the court arbitrary aids of construction, such as the doctrine of
ejusdem generis,20 are resorted to.
B. Particular Characteristics of the Substance
Courts will normally consider the particular characteristics of the substance
in question when deciding whether or not certain substances should be
included in a conveyance of "other minerals." These characteristics and
their relative effect upon the surface and mineral estates are vital to a
determination of the ownership of the coal.
Natural Meaning Test. Texas courts early realized that if all matter were
divided into three classes of animal, vegetable, and mineral, a broad
definition of the term "mineral" would encompass the soil itself as well as all
substances contained therein. 21  To use such a broad definition would
remove any distinction between the mineral estate and the surface estate, a
result the courts have generally rejected as unreasonable. 22  On the other
hand the courts have also rejected an undue restriction of the term to its
technical meaning which would include only metallic ores and precious
metals. 23  Many recent cases support an inquiry into the meaning of the
words which were used in the grant and which at the time of the grant were
a part of the vernacular of the mining industry, the commercial world, and
the landowners.2 4  By establishing this "ordinary and natural meaning
19. Id. § 839.
20. The rule of ejusdem generis states that when the terms "mineral" or "mineral
rights" are coupled with an enumeration of specific substances, the general words follow-
ing a specific enumeration will be limited to things of a like class. See R. HEMINGWAY,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1.1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HEMINGWAY].
See also text accompanying notes 79-85 infra.
21. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); Anderson & Kerr Drill-
ing Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800 (1940); Fleming Foundation v.
Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. See, e.g., Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ App.-E1 Paso 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. See, e.g., Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ
ref'd).
24. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949) (limestone held not
included in devise of "mineral rights"); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer,
134 Tex. 574, 577, 136 S.W.2d 800, 802 (1940) (oil and gas held included in reservation
of "one-half interest in all Minerells Paint Rock &c found or will be found" on conveyed
tract); Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (water not included in reservation of "oil, gas, and other minerals");
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test" these courts have provided a standard easily applicable to those sub-
stances traditionally considered minerals. 25
There is another line of authority which recognizes a need for a more
liberal standard to encompass newly discovered minerals. This standard,
which was implied in Luse v. Boatman26 and expressly established in Cain
v. Neumann,27 is based upon a presumed intention of the parties to sever
completely the surface and mineral estates. Consequently, the minerals
included in the mineral estate need not have been contemplated or even
discovered at the time of the grant.28 The court in Cain recognized that, as
people's concepts change, the term "minerals" should encompass new sub-
stances. One writer interprets Cain as holding that the recognition of a
substance as a mineral should be applied to instruments executed before the
substance was recognized as such since absence of knowledge of the
substance at the time of the deed does not alter the clear intent to convey
"other minerals."' 29
Unique Value Test. When no specific intention is expressed by the parties
as to a particular substance, some courts have classified the substance as a
mineral by considering whether the substance has an exceptional characteris-
tic or possesses a peculiar property giving it a special value apart from the
surface itself.30  On the basis of this value test several courts have held that
sand, gravel, and common stones belong to the surface estate and do not pass
under a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals."3 1  These cases have
reasoned that the term "minerals" contemplates only substances of particular
value, and that sand, gravel, and building stone are not valuable within the
ordinary meaning of the term. The leading case is Heinatz v. Allen.32 'In
Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd) (reserva-
tion of an individual one-half interest in all "minerals" did not include sand and gravel).
25. This concedes that oil, gas, coal, sand, gravel, etc., are within the legal meaning
of "other minerals" but says that if the minerals were not known to exist at the time
of the conveyance, then they could not be considered within the popular meaning at that
time. Therefore, since they were not included in the popular meaning of "minerals,"
the intent of the parties could not have been to include them.
26. 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ refd). The implication
in Luse that knowledge of the particular substance at the time of conveyance or reserva-
tion was immaterial was adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Elliott v. Nelson, 113
Tex. 62, 251 S.W. 501 (1923).
27. 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (uranium in-
cluded in a grant of "all oil, gas, coal, and other minerals").
28. According to one writer the citation to Luse suggests that the Cain court relied
upon the premise that specific words of exception are required to remove any particular
substance from a grant of unnamed minerals. See Holland, Is Helium Covered by Oil
and Gas Leases?, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 408 (1963).
29. See Comment, note 15 supra. The reasoning appears sound based on the as-
sumption that the intent of the parties to the deed was not to reserve only known min-
erals but to have a complete severance of the estates and to give to the holder of the
mineral estate the right to extract any valuable substances from beneath the surface,
whether the substance was known to exist or not. The grantor is attempting to give
one party the right to use the surface and the other the right to extract and market valu-
able substances found in the ground.
30. See HEMINGWAY § 1.2.
31. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); Eldridge v. Edmond-
son, 252 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Psencik v. Wes-
sels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd).
32. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949). The unique value test can actually be
traced back to the old land department cases where the court was attempting to formu-
1976]
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Heinatz the Texas Supreme Court found that limestone of the particular
character involved was not a "mineral" included in a devise of "mineral
rights." 3  In the court's opinion substances such as sand, gravel, and
limestone were not "minerals" within the ordinary and natural meaning of
the word unless they possessed some special value, such as sand valuable for
making glass and limestone of such quality as to be profitably manufactured
into cement.84 This theory was recently given additional support by the
Texas Supreme Court. In Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp. the court
held that salt water was not a mineral but an incident of the surface estate. 35
The court noted that a different case would be present if a mineral in
solution was valuable enough to justify production of the water to extract the
minerals therein.8 6
Despite Heinatz and Robinson the "unique value" test has not been totally
accepted by Texas courts. Limestone, caliche, and surface shale that could
have been profitably sold for the manufacture of cement were held in
Atwood v. Rodman to be excluded from conveyances and exceptions of "oil,
gas, and other minerals."37 The court of civil appeals expressly rejected the
Heinatz example of limestone possessing a special value for use in cement. 8
In Guinn v. Acker the court of civil appeals again refused to hold that the
unique value test controlled the determination of "other minerals."8 9  Ac-
cording to the court in Guinn a decision whether the term "other minerals"
includes iron ore cannot be controlled by the fact that iron ore is commer-
cially profitable for making pig iron or for road building, or that it possesses
a definite chemical formula. 40 Upon appeal the supreme court seemed to
consider the unique value of the iron ore more seriously than did the court of
civil appeals. 41  It found the test was not controlling, however, and gave
approval to the Atwood decision. 42
late a test for fixing the character of land as mineral or nonmineral. The test adopted
was whether the land was more valuable for mineral purposes than for agricultural pur-
poses and holding it to be mineral or nonmineral according to the preponderance of the
evidence upon this point. See Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Mike & Starr Gold & Silver
Mining Co., 143 U.S. 394 (1892); Francour v. Newhouse, 40 F. 618 (1889); McLaugh-
lin v. Powell, .50 Cal. 64 (1875); Alford v. Barnum, 45 Cal. 482 (1872); Merrill v.
Dixon, 15 Nev. 401 (1880). See also 1 W. SNYDER, supra note 8, § 159.
33. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
34. Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997. See also Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d
605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which directly affirms the Heinatz
case.
35. 501 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1973).
36. Id.
37. 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ refd n.r.e.).
38. The court in Atwood held this example was unnecessary to the disposition of
the Heinatz case and, therefore, mere obiter dictum, not judicial precedent. However,
the court also considered the general nature of the land where the limestone lay and
decided that, since it was common to both the local and state area, it was not of rare
or exceptional character. So in essence, while rejecting the Heinatz case on its face,
the Atwood decision impliedly lent credence to the theory of unique value.
39. Guinn v. Acker, 451 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), af!'d, 464 S.W.
2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
40. 451 S.W.2d at 551.
41. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
42. Both Atwood and Acker, which seemed to reject the unique value test, can be
better explained by reasoning that they did not totally discard the test. The courts in
both cases considered the unique value test but chose not to hold it controlling. Their
main consideraton was with the fact that the mineral involved could only be extracted
by the open pit method leading to a complete destruction of the surface estate. The
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Relation to Surface Test. To determine whether a particular substance
should be included as "other minerals" some courts have considered whether
the substance in question is traditionally associated with surface ownership
by being essential or beneficial to the utilization of the surface of the land.43
In Heinatz v. Allen there was evidence that fifteen acres of the four-
hundred-acre tract in question consisted of exposed limestone.44 The court
drew an analogy between the limestone in Heinatz and the sand and gravel
in Psencik v. Wessels 45 and Winsett v. Watson,46 apparently indicating that
they were in a class of substances which courts hold to be excluded from a
grant or reservation of "minerals" because of an extremely close relation to
the soil. 47  In Acker v. Guinn48 evidence was introduced which showed the
iron ore deposits lying from the surface to about fifty feet below the surface,
and in places lying on top of the ground itself. This fact seemed to make
the iron ore so much a part of the surface estate that the court refused to
allow it to pass to the owners of the minerals without expression of a clearer
intention than "oil, gas, and other minerals." The test appears to state that
when a substance has an indestructible intimacy with the soil and with the
use of the surface it becomes classified as part of the "surface." 49
Surface Destruction Test. Supplementing the theory that minerals in close
proximity to the soil become part of the surface estate is the theory that the
surface owner should retain title to any substances requiring an extraction
process which would tend to render the surface of the land useless.50 The
basis of this theory is that the original parties could not have intended as
"other minerals" any substance the extraction of which would destroy the
surface estate. A corollary to this analysis states that the inclusion as
"mineral" of the substance which comprises such a large part of the surface
would make the grant or reservation so large that there would be nothing
conveyed or reserved, a result that surely could not have been intended. For
years Heinatz v. Allen was the ruling case in Texas relating to substances
recoverable only by open pit or strip mining.51 The court recognized that
courts seemed to balance this surface destruction test against the unique value test and
hold the former controlling. While the court in Heinatz considered the destruction of
the surface test, it expressly held it was not decisive of the question of inclusion. The
surface destruction test will be discussed later. See text accompanying notes 50-60 infra.
43. See HEMINGWAY § 31.2.
44. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
45. 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd).
46. 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, writ ref'd).
47. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949). In Heinatz the Texas Supreme Court
stated:
The limestone ...underlying most if not all of the land at varying and
usually shallow depths, outcropping in all the ravines, sometimes found on
the top of the surface . . . is so closely related to the soil, so nearly a part
of the very surface, the soil itself, that it is reasonably and ordinarily con-
sidered a part of the soil and as belonging to the surface estate rather
than as a part of the minerals or mineral rights.
Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
48. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
49. See Emery, What Surface Is Mineral and What Mineral Is Surface, 12 OKLA.
L. Rav. 499 (1959).
50. See HEMINGWAY § 1.2.
51. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949). See also Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252
S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the required quarrying would destroy the surface for agricultural and grazing
purposes. 52 Although held not to be decisive in itself, this mining process
and its resulting damage was considered heavily in a determination of the
intent of the grantor. 53 Heinatz was followed by Atwood v. Rodman which
held that a grantor reserving or conveying "oil, gas, and other minerals" did
not intend to reserve or convey limestone, caliche, or surface shale which are
recoverable only by the open pit method.5 4  The court found these sub-
stances to belong to the surface owner who had the right to use any possible
method to extract them. Currently, the leading case in this area is Acker v.
Guinn.55 Although no test to determine what substances were included in
the term "other minerals" was specifically set out in Acker, the court looked
to the effect that strip mining iron ore would have on the surface estate.
The grant or reservation of "minerals" would not be considered under the
Acker holding to include a substance that must be removed by methods that
would, in effect, consume or deplete a surface estate used for agricultural or
grazing purposes. 50 The court limited the scope of the general intent of the
parties with the statement: "The parties . . .usually think of the mineral
estate as including valuable substances that are removed from the ground by
means of wells or mine shafts."'57  One author suggests that by this
statement the court in Acker was indirectly taking judicial notice, of the
widespread common knowledge concerning production of oil and gas in
Texas, and the predominant use of the formbook style "oil, gas, and other
minerals."5 8
The most recent case involving the determination of whether a substance
requiring destruction of the surface for recovery was a "mineral" is Williford
v. Spies.50 This case decided that coal would not pass to the mineral estate
under a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals." The entire basis of
the decision was the theory used in Acker: the parties to the conveyance
could not have intended to define "minerals" as a substance which had to be
removed by methods that would destroy the surface estate. The court would
only construe "minerals" to mean such a substance upon the finding of an
intention affirmatively and fairly expressed in the instrument containing the
grant or reservation. Since no such intention was expressed, the court found
that the coal belonged to the surface owner. 60
C. Limitations in the Language of the Deed
The intention of the parties to a deed is to be determined by a reading of
the instrument as a whole.61 An unambiguous instrument can be construed
52. 147 Tex. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 998.
53. Id. at 518-19, 217 S.W.2d at 998.
54. 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
56. Id. at 351.
57. Id. at 352.
58. See Comment, note 15 supra.
59. 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
60. Id. at 130.
61. 2 R. DEVLIN, supra note 10, § 884a.
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to include or exclude certain substances within the terms "other minerals"
depending upon an intention of the parties found in the habendum clause or
in certain provisions relating to the manner of extraction and the easements
or privileges incident to the employment of the granted or reserved mineral
interest. 62 Language limited to methods and structures appropriate to hard
mineral or surface mining may indicate, for example, an intent not to include
oil and gas.6 3 Texas courts have even held that granting a right to "mine"
does not include the right to drill for oil and gas.64  If "mining" were
interpreted in such a restricted sense, it would not be difficult to imagine
courts holding minerals which could only be extracted by open pit mining as
not included in the grant or reservation. 5 The general rule in Texas,
however, seems to regard "mine" as a generic term which includes all means
of extracting metals and minerals from beneath the ground. 66
The major Texas case restricting a mineral grant to substances extracted
in a certain manner is Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey.67 In this
case a lease for purposes of exploration, development, and exploitation of
oil, gas, and other minerals was held not to include gravel. The intention of
the parties to the lease was evidenced by certain provisions in the instrument
which provided the lessee should have the right to "erect derricks," "build
tanks," and "lay pipe lines" on the land. There was nothing in the lease
mentioning appropriate means for the production of gravel; the provisions
listed applied only to the production of oil and gas. The royalty payment
was relative to the quantity delivered in pipelines or tanks and did not
appear to contemplate gravel.68
D. Ambiguities
"Other Minerals" as an Ambiguous Term. The Texas courts agree that if
the deed under consideration is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be
admitted to show the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties'
execution of the instruments. The court can thus arrive at the true meaning
of the instrument and the intention of the parties. 69 The courts are split,
however, with respect to whether the term "other minerals" standing alone or
in conjunction with the provisions in the deed creates an ambiguity.70 The
62. See HEMINGWAY § 1.1.
63. Id.
64. Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co., 187 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1916, writ ref'd).
65. This would not be very significant since these substances are usually not in-
clujled as "minerals" due to their geographic location in relation to the soil or due to
their destructive method of extraction as previously discussed. See notes 43-60 supra,
and accompanying text.
66. Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd).
67. 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1929, writ ref'd). This case illus-
trates the tendency of courts to use extrinsic evidence in the process of construing an
instrument even though they declare that such evidence is not to be admitted to show
contrary intention once the interpretation process is accomplished. See note 15 supra.
68. 15 S.W.2d at 698.
69. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co.
v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800 (1940); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n
v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1929, writ ref'd).
70. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949). See also 1 E. KUNrz,
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majority of cases in Texas favor declaring the term clear on its face and
disallowing any extrinsic evidence to the contrary. 7I The leading case in
this area is Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer.72  In Anderson &
Kerr the court held that a reservation of one-half interest in all minerals
"plainly and clearly evidenced the intention of the grantors to reserve all
minerals including oil and gas."'78 This holding was specifically affirmed in
Heinatz v. Allen which held that the intention of the testatrix as to what was
devised was to be ascertained without aid from evidence as to the attending
circumstances.7 4  The most recent case on this issue was Williford v. Spies.
In Williford the court of civil appeals held that the intention of the parties in
an unambiguous instrument containing a reservation of "oil, gas, and other
minerals" was to be ascertained by construing the language in the instrument
without the aid of extrinsic evidence. 75  The court cited both Anderson &
Kerr and Heinatz.76
Texas has, upon occasion, subscribed to a more subjective test of intent
which allows inquiry into the extrinsic facts surrounding the execution of
what the courts term ambiguous conveyances. 77 According to 'Psencik v.
Wessels78 the proper construction of this ambiguous conveyance of unnamed
minerals should rest upon what the instrument means in light of its evident
purpose, its context, and its surrounding circumstances.
Ejusdem Generis. In 1918 the court of civil appeals in Luse v. Boatman
defined the rule of ejusdem generis to mean that "where there is an
enumeration of particular things, followed by general words, the latter shall
be construed as having reference to things only of the same kind and class
with those specifically mentioned . . . -79 Although on its face this rule
appears quite clear and helpful, the court in Luse v. Boatman refused to
apply it.80 The court pointed out that it did not know what qualities or
peculiarities of "coal" to consider when determining the classification intend-
ed by the use of the word "minerals." Considering the nature of origin of
the substances, coal could be distinguished from oil and gas as could a solid
from a liquid. Considering use, however, they are almost indistinguishable,
supra note 11, § 16.1. Attention must once again be called to the fact that this discus-
sion concerns the use of extrinsic evidence for purposes of construction of the instrument
rather than for purposes of interpretation of individual terms. See note 15 supra.
Whether or not a grant or reservation of "other minerals" will be ambiguous will depend
on its interpretation in light of the other provisions in the instrument, resulting in a case-
by-case determination.
71. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512,
217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574,
136 S.W.2d 800 (1940); Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1975, no writ); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1929, writ ref'd).
72. 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800 (1940).
73. Id. at 583-84, 136 S.W.2d at 805.
74. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
75. 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
76. Id. at 130, 131.
77. Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, writ
ref'd); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd).
78. 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd).
79. 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd).
80. Id. at 1099.
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both being sources of fuel. Uncertainties such as these caused the court in
Luse to render the rule of ejusdem generis an unsafe guide to interpretation.8'
The Texas Supreme Court in Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp. stated that the doctrine of ejusdem generis had never been
applied in Texas.82  Holding that gas was included in a reservation of
"minerals," the court cited the Anderson & Kerr case and Rio Bravo Oil Co.
v. McEntire83 as support for the theory that the rule had never been
accepted. One writer views these cases as stating that absent ambiguity the
rule of ejusdem generis is not a rule of construction, applicable at all times,
but only an interpretative aid to be used when the intention is not otherwise
apparent from the instrument.8 4  Upon determining the instrument clear
and unambiguous the court should not consider the rule. Thus, Southland's
rejection of the rule was unnecessary because it held the instrument to be
unambiguous. The writer also thought the court of appeals in Guinn v.
Acker had erroneously interpreted the rule by holding that the instrument
was unambiguous but at the same time applying the rule.8 5
II. COAL AND ITS MINING PROCESSES IN TEXAS
Information concerning the location, nature, and means of extraction of
coal in Texas is necessary to determine the right of the mineral and surface
estates in their respective claims to coal.8 6 This technological information is
not only essential for describing the nature of Texas coal and its relation to
the mineral kingdom, but also for demonstrating that in many cases there is no
alternative to strip mining. With respect to strip mining, discussion of the
81. The rule had been used prior to Luse by the Texas Supreme Court in holding
that a deed conveying land to a railroad company for a right of way along with the
right to take all "timber, earth, stone and mineral" did not convey oil which had to be
drilled for, even though it was a mineral. However, the development of Texas' use of
the rule in construing mineral deeds has been comparatively slow, with few decisions
actually using the rule. Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co.,
106 Tex. 94, 157 S.W. 737 (1913). Several courts subsequent to the court in Right of
Way Oil Co. discussed the risk of ejusdem generis. Guinn v. Acker, 451 S.W.2d 549
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), af'd, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971); Atwood v. Rodman,
355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fleming Foundation
v. Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. 378 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964).
83. 128 Tex. 124, 96 S.W.2d 1110 (1936).
84. See Note, Has Ejusdem Generis as Applied to Mineral Deeds Been Accepted in
Texas?, 2 TEX. TECH L. REV. 164 (1971). See also Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v.
Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800 (1940); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. McEntire, 128
Tex. 124, 96 S.W.2d 1110 (1936); Richardson v. Nesbit, 204 S.W. 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1918, writ ref'd).
85. 451 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), af 'd, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.
1971). Upon appeal the supreme court rejected the use of the ejusdem generis rule.
There are several other rules of construction such as: (1) expressio unius est exclusio
alterius-the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another; (2) the instrument will
be construed against the party who prepared the instrument and is responsible for the
language used; (3) the provisions of the granting clause will control in the event of an
irreconcilable conflict with other provisions; and (4) a specific description of the interest
in the deed will control over a general description. See 1 E. KUNTZ, supra note 11,
§ 16.1. See also HEMINGWAY § 1.1. However, the Texas courts have not found these
rules effective in interpreting a grant or reservation of "oil, gas, and other minerals" so
they will not be discussed here.
86. The discussion here will be limited to lignite coal and its mining methods for
it not only presents the greatest potential as an energy resource but it is also the most
frequently mined coal in Texas today. Significant information is lacking for any com-
petent assessment of identified bituminous coal reserves, quality, and economic aspects
surrounding potential bituminous coal development. T. EVANS, supra note 3, at 6.
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new Texas Surface Mining and Reclamation Act 87 and the possibility of
successful reclamation in Texas is relevant.
In Texas lignite coal is found in near-surface and deep-basin deposits
throughout the Texas Gulf Coastal 'Plain.88 Near-surface lignite occurs in
two elongated bands stretching from the Rio Grande to the 'Red River.
Deep-basin lignite occurs coastward and downdip from the near-surface
resource locations.8 9
All of the lignite currently mined in Texas and located at depths of less
than 200 feet is strip mined. Modern earth moving equipment and the
availability of large lignite reserves beneath shallow, unconsolidated overbur-
den make surface mining more economical than underground mining. The
term "surface mining" or "strip mining" refers to processes by which
minerals are uncovered from the surface of the earth and then extracted. It
is distinguished from deep mining in which a shaft is constructed to the
mineral vein and the mineral is extracted through the shaft. 90 The process
most often begins with the use of heavy equipment to strip away the
overburden and to gain access to the minerals. 91 When the overburden is
removed the minerals are usually extracted by smaller mechanical equip-
ment. The increase in size and efficiency of strip mining machinery has
permitted a steady increase in the maximum amount of overburden which
can be stripped away. Presently, overburden of 180 to 185 feet thick is
being removed in large-scale operations. A maximum of 200 feet does not
seem unrealistic.
All types of surface mining have a significant effect upon the surrounding
area. The immediate effects of surface mining have been classified into five
87. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-10 (Supp. 1975-76).
88. The following discussion concerning lignite coal is based upon W. KAISER,
TEXAS LIGNITE: NEAR-SURFACE AND DEEP-BASIN RESOURCES (1974) and a telephone
conversation with Professor Kaiser of the Bureau of Economic Geology at the University
of Texas. Instead of citing each factual statement to these sources, the reader may as-
sume that support for any factual statement not marked with a citation was from these
sources.
89. Deep-basin lignite is a vast potential energy resource that can possibly be tapped
through in situ gassification recovery methods. Deep basin lignites are most numerous
and thickest in Madison, Houston, Leon, Lee, Fayette, and Bastrop Counties. The most
promising available underground gassification method applicable to the gently dipping
Texas lignites is the percolation method. This method involves penetrating the coal
seam with long horizontal boreholes or by vertical boreholes spaced 40 to 400 feet apart
and located in a geometric pattern of rhombohedroids, rectangles, squares, or concentric
circles. If the seam is penetrated by horizontal boreholes, fewer holes are necessary.
Gassification takes place between different pairs of linked boreholes with offtake and
intake holes depending on the locational pattern and gassification procedure. Poten-
tially, underground gassification of coal is a cheap source of energy for electric power
generation and raw material for synthetic gasses, liquid fuels, and other chemicals. The
methods so far developed can produce a combustible gas of low Btu value but not on
a continuous basis or at a constant Btu value. Because the Btu rating of gas from un-
derground gassification is low it will be uneconomical to pipe long distances without up-
grading to pipeline quality. Future exploitation will require the siting of electric-power
or synthetic pipeline-quality gas plants at or reasonably close to the underground gassi-
fier.
90. S. CASSIDY, ELEMENTS OF PRACTICAL COAL MINING 386 (1973).
91. One dragline in use has a capacity of 220 cubic yards (325 tons) of overburden.
It can dig down to 185 feet and costs $24,000,000. It has been estimated that a dragline
of 145 cubic yards capacity could dig out the Panama Canal in fifty-five 16-hour days.




categories: air pollution, water pollution, safety and health hazards, noise
and vibration, and destruction of aesthetics. 92  Strip mining alters the land
surface and topography, exposing formerly buried rocks and soil to the
atmosphere. These exposed substances may yield toxic particulates that are
potential pollutants of streams and surrounding lands. Acid water runoff is
a serious problem where the overburden and coal are high in sulfur and the
climate warm and humid. At the present time acid water runoff has not
become a serious problem in Texas because the lignite being extracted is
moderately low in sulfur content with a sulfur-free overburden.
Land is not necessarily ruined or lost from future usefulness as a result of
the strip mining of coal. There is abundant evidence that the large and
responsible coal mining operators have been successful in beautifying
stripped areas and have converted these strip mined lands into game and
wildlife refuges, artificial lakes for boating, swimming, fishing and other
recreation, forests, and grazing lands. 93  There are even accounts that the
restored land consisting of the overburden is more tolerable to certain types
of plant growth and provides better flood control. 94
Basically, three factors are determinative of a successful reclamation
program: climate, terrain, and land capability. 95  In areas of relatively high
rainfall such as East Texas revegetation occurs easily and naturally, and
artificial lakes can be shaped for recreation, stock ponds, or homesites.
Terrain is not as significant an impediment to reclamation in Texas as in
other areas. In Texas the lignite occurs in flat to moderately rolling country,
a topography easily reproduced by redistribution and remolding of parallel
rows of unconsolidated spoil. Furthermore, most of the lignite lands of
92. See Brooks, Strip Mine Reclamation and Economic Analysis, 6 NAT. RES. J. 13
(1966).
93. See Donley, Some Observations on the Law of the Strip-Mining of Coal, 11
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 123 (1966). See also Rielly, For Better Strip Reclamation,
COAL AGE, Dec. 1965, at 83-87 ("the long term reclamation plans of the Hanna Coal
Division, Consolidated Coal Co., insure that the potential use of mineral lands will be
as good as it was before mining, whether for part-time farming, grazing, industrializa-
tion, forestry or recreation"); Strip Mining, The Total Benefit Industry, COAL AGE,
Dec. 1966, at 93-116 ("the strip mining industry has provided communities in strip mining
areas with new recreational facilities, improved water supplies and many economic bene-
fits"); Vande & Linde, Reclamation Accomplishments of the Coal Mining Industry,
MINING CONG. J., Dec. 1971, at 58-61 ("the coal industry has a record in mined land rec-
lamation that is little known. It is time for the public to understand what is actually
being achieved."). In Texas, an example of successful reclamation projects are those
run jointly by the Dallas Power & Light Co., the Texas Power & Light Co., and the
Texas Electric Service Co. located at the Martin Lake plant near Henderson in Rusk
County, the Monticello plant near Mt. Pleasant in Titus County, and the Big Brown
plant near Fairfield in Freestone County. After the lignite is removed, the displaced
earth is redistributed, and trees, grasses, and other vegetation native to the area are
planted. Runoff water from the mining area is constantly monitored to see that federal
and state water quality standards are met. The three companies have agreements with
the various state and local governmental bodies to restore the reclaimed areas to recrea-
tional projects available to the public. At the Big Brown plant, Fairfield State Park was
created by the Texas Parks & Wildlife Department, and has attracted hundreds of
thousands of tourists. At Monticello, Titus County is developing a park which has al-
ready become a very popular fishing and recreational area. Recreational facilities are
planned for the Martin Lake site. DALLAS POWER & LIGHT Co., ELEcTRIcITY FOR
PROGRESS wrrIH LIGNITE COAL (1976).
94. Brooks, Strip Mining, Reclamation, and the Public Interest, AMERICAN FORESTS,
March 1966, at 18-19.
95. W. KAISER, TEXAS LIGNITE: NEAR-SURFACE AND DEEP-BASIN REsouRcEs (1974).
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Texas are post oak savannah. The topsoils are not significantly different
from the underlying sediments and rocks so that the topsoils are not much
more fertile than overburden. If this area were rich, productive farmland,
the results of strip mining would be much more severe. Fortunately, the
principal lignite deposits and the principal strip mining are in the eastern
part of the state where this favorable climate and terrain make the situation
conducive to successful reclamation projects.
The recently enacted Texas Surface Mining and Reclamation Act98 is
designed to prevent the adverse effects to society and the environment which
result from unregulated surface mining operations and to protect the rights of
surface landowners.97 The statute creates a commission to have exclusive
jurisdiction over the establishment of reclamation requirements for mining
operations in the state.98 One of the commission's most important powers is
to issue permits which will be required before any person can conduct
surface mining operations in Texas.99 The Act establishes certain reclama-
tion standards which must be met by the surface mining operations.' 10
Among other things these standards require the operator to conduct his
mining operations in so prudent a manner as to maximize the utilization and
conservation of the resource recovered, to restore the affected land to the
same or a substantially beneficial condition, to reduce all spoil piles so as to
control erosion and sustain vegetation, and to replace the topsoil or the best
available subsoil on top of the land to be reclaimed. 10 1 The statute requires
that the surface mining operator file with the commissioner a performance
bond payable to the State of Texas and conditioned upon full and faithful
performance of all the requirements of the Act. 10 2 The amount of the bond
will be determined by the commission but will be sufficient to assure the
completion of the reclamation plan if the work must be completed by a third
party in the event of forfeiture.' 08 The statute provides for enforcement by
giving any member of the commission the power to order the immediate
cessation of surface mining operations upon the determination that any
practice exists in violation of any requirement of the Act.' 0 4 The statute
also empowers the commission upon finding a violation to bring civil suit for
an injunction against the practice or for a fine of not more than $5,000 for
each day of violation or for both an injunction and a fine.' 05 All sums
received through the payment of fees, loans, grants, penalties, and bond
forfeitures will go to a fund to be expended for the administration and
enforcement of the Act and for the reclamation of lands affected by surface
mining operations.'0 6
96. Tax. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-10 (Supp. 1975-76).
97. Id. § 3.
98. Id. § 6.
99. Id. §§ 6, 8.
100. Id. § 11.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 14.
103. Id.
104. Id. § 20.
105. Id. § 21.
106. Id. § 22.
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The United States Department of the Interior has estimated that in 1965
surface mining accounted for approximately four-fifths of the total mineral
production in the United States. 107 In the last fifteen years there has been
a definite trend toward surface mining methods rather than underground
methods.' 08 There are several explanations for favoring surface mining
over underground mining. The explanations generally center around eco-
nomics. 109 The cost per ton is greatly reduced by surface mining because of
the relative ease of obtaining the coal."10 There is also a much greater
percentage of coal recovery-nearly ninety-five percent from surface mines
as compared to an average of fifty percent from underground mines."'
Much surface mining retrieves coal that could not be extracted by under-
ground methods due to coal bed thinness, multiple beds close together, split
seams, the nature of the roof, and other geologic conditions."12  As a result
of these different economic and geologic conditions, there is very often no
choice but to strip mine.
One possible alternative to either underground or strip mining is under-
ground gassification of coal, but this involves problems of its own. 113
Technology on the subsurface gassification process is in the initial stage.
Only in the USSR have industrial plants for underground gassification been
installed. Worldwide, there has been very little advancement in available
technology since about 1965. The United States Bureau of Mines and the
Union Pacific Corporation have been conducting a joint project at Hanna,
Wyoming, since 1972 to test the economics and technology of the process.
Several universities and privately owned companies are also experimenting
with underground coal gassification. Aside from the lack of technological
development, much of the coal currently being strip mined is located in too
shallow an area to be converted into energy by in situ methods. Mining in
the East Texas area is an example. There are also several unsolved
problems with the process regarding control of the fire front (location, size,
and temperature) or combustion zone, roof collapse, leaking of points within
the coal seam, leakage of the gassifying agent and product gas, groundwater
flow into the reaction zone causing ground water contamination, and surface
subsidence. The threat to ground water acquifers can be effectively mini-
mized by gassifying coal seams below the principal acquifers. This means
utilization of deeper coal beds, however, and would not even involve those
beds of coal obtained through strip mining. Once developed, subsurface
gassification will effectively utilize deep-basin resources of coal but will do
little towards furnishing an alternative to surface mining.
1 4
107. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT 42
(1967).
108. See Brooks, supra note 92.




113. See note 89 supra.
114. See W. KAISER, supra note 95. See also Lignite, Rebirth of a Texas Resource,
2 TExAs ENERGY & MINERAL RESOURCES, Dec. 1975, at 2.
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III. RELATIVE RIGHTS OF THE MINERAL OWNER
AND SURFACE OWNER
As previously discussed, the two most recent cases involving an interpreta-
tion of a grant or reservation of "oil, gas, and other minerals" held as
controlling the fact that the substance could only be removed by surface
mining.115 Since the means of extraction resulted in the destruction of the
surface estates, the courts gave the substance to the surface owner. 116 The
courts place great emphasis on the mode of extraction in determining the
intent of the parties. A discussion of the relative rights that accompany the
mineral and surface estates under a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other
minerals" will be necessary, therefore, to any determination of who should
own coal which requires strip mining.
In Texas the mineral estate is an estate in land capable of being severed
from the surface estate so that each estate may be owned in fee simple
absolute by different parties. 1 7 The severance of the two estates can be
effectuated by deed through a conveyance, reservation, or exception."18
The mineral estate is treated as a real property interest and is controlled by
real property conveyance laws." 9 The nature of the mineral estate requires
use of the surface estate for exploring, mining, or drilling. A severance of
the two estates, therefore, often makes it necessary to establish the rights of
the two estate holders.
In Texas the mineral estate has long been held the dominant estate;
120
the mineral owner or lessee possesses the right to use and possess so much of
the surface of the land and at such a time, place, and manner as is
reasonably necessary to enjoy the mineral estate.' 2' Without such a
dominant-servient system the ownership of the mineral estate would be
worthless since there would be no means to enter and extract the valuable
substances. There are some basic limitations, however, on the dominant
estate. Only that amount of the surface estate reasonably necessary to the
utilization of the mineral estate may be used.' 22 Additionally, any use of
115. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971); Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d
127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
116. As seen by the prior discussion of reclamation, it is very questionable whether
this treatment of surface mining as destroying the surface estate is valid. See notes 93-
106 supra and accompanying text.
117. Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 255, 254 S.W. 296, 299
(1923); Shields v. Harris County, 248 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1952,
writ refd n.r.e.); County School Trustees v. Free, 154 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.). See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OiL
AND GAS LAW 431 (1971).
118. Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 256, 254 S.W. 296, 299
(1923); See 1 E. KUNTZ, supra note 11, § 14.1.
119. County School Trustees v. Free, 154 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.); see 1 E. KuNTz, supra note 11, § 14.1.
120. Chambers Liberty County Navigation Dist. v. Banta, 453 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex.
1970); General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 106, 344 S.W.2d 668, 669
(1961).
121. Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957);
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954); see Note,
Eminent Domain, 47 TExAS L. REv. 1458, 1461 n.14 (1969).
122. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones,
470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.
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the surface estate by the owner or lessee of the mineral estate must not be
negligent. 123  These basic limitations have been discussed and slightly
expanded in three leading cases.' 24
In Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 125 the Waco court of civil appeals
held that the owner of the mineral estate was not liable for damages to the
owner of the surface estate for subsidence of the surface resulting from the
mining of sulfur. The sulfur had been extracted by the "frasch process,' '1 26
which had caused a surface subsidence of from two inches to three feet in
some places. However, since the process used was the only commercially
known method of extracting the sulfur, and since there were no allegations of
negligence, the process was accepted as a reasonably necessary use of the
surface. The court held that the law of Texas and the commonly used oil
and gas leases in the state permit the lessee or owner of the mineral estate to
use as much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to enjoy the mineral
lease and to effectuate its purpose.
In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones 27 the Texas Supreme Court considered the
right of a mineral lessee to the use of the vertical space above the surface
when that use prevented the surface owner from implementing a certain
irrigation system. Getty Oil Co. had installed two beam-type pumping units,
one of which was seventeen feet high at the top of its upstroke and the other
thirty-four feet high. This prevented Jones, the surface owner, from install-
ing a sprinkler system which was supported by towers at a height of seven
feet above the ground. The Texas Supreme Court, although recognizing the
mineral estate as the dominant estate, found for the surface owner. When
only one manner of use of the surface can produce the minerals, the lessee or
owner of the mineral rights has the right to pursue this use regardless of
surface damage. The court found, however, that there was ample evidence
to prove that Getty could use other methods to effectuate its oil and gas
lease, while the irrigation system used by Jones was the most advantageous
and perhaps the only reasonable means of developing the surface for
agricultural purposes. The court was heavily influenced by the fact that
other lessees in the area had gone to the added expense of placing pumping
units in concrete cellars below the surface. This led to the court's finding
1967); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957);
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954).
123. Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 86, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (1961); General Crude
Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 106, 344 S.W.2d 668, 669 (1961); Kenny v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ ref'd).
124. The most recent case dealing with the relative rights of the surface estate owner
and the mineral estate owner is Winslow v. Duvall County Ranch Co., 519 S.W.2d 217
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The plaintiff had obtained a tempo-
rary injunction restraining the mineral lessee from pumping, flowing, or producing any
oil or gas from his leases, on the ground that his operations were polluting the surface
of the land. In overturning the injunction, the court stated that under the modern con-
cept of the correlative rights of the surface owner and the mineral lessee, the mineral
lessee is limited to uses which are reasonably necessary and which are made with due
regard for the rights of the surface owner, citing both Sun Oil Co. and Getty for support.
125. 351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ ref'd).
126. The "frasch process" is a method of mining deep-lying sulfur by forcing into
the deposit very hot water and pumping out the sulfur thereby melted. See WEBSTER's
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 903 (8th ed. 1961).
127. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
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that Getty's use of the surface was unreasonable and unnecessary. The
court expressly added to this reasonably necessary standard the corollary
that the rights implied in favor of the mineral estate are to be exercised with
due regard for the rights of the owner of the servient estate.
The Getty case was quickly followed by Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker.128 The
issue in Sun was whether a mineral lessee had the right to use fresh,
subterranean water in its waterflood operation as part of its right to a
reasonably necessary use of the surface. Upon rehearing the Texas Su-
preme Court, in a sharply divided decision, withdrew its original opinion and
rendered a decision that reversed itself, the court of civil appeals, and the
district court. Under the court's decision the surface owner was enjoined
from interfering with utilization of not more than 100,000 gallons of fresh
water per day for waterflooding operations. 129  The court distinguished
Getty by finding that in the present case there was no reasonable alternative
method available to the lessee on the premises. As a result of owning the
dominant estate, Sun had the implied right to use so much of the premises as
was reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the lease with due
regard for the rights of the owner of the surface estate. Justice McGee,
speaking for the majority, stated that the use of the fresh water was
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease because Sun's
attempts to use available supplies of salt water had failed and there were no
other available sources of water on the premises. To require Sun to
purchase water for its waterflooding operations from an outsider would be in
total conflict with the dominant-servient theory.
It is submitted that in both Getty and Sun the court is balancing the
agricultural interests of the surface owner with the interests of the mineral
lessee. Due to practical alternatives available to the mineral lessee in Getty,
the scales tipped in favor of the surface owner. In Sun, however, the lack of
an alternative extraction method weighed in favor of the mineral estate. The
surface estate had to yield regardless of the fact that the depletion of a
limited supply of fresh water meant the ultimate destruction of the surface.
These three cases are not directly related to the issue of the ownership of
coal under a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals." The ownership
of the coal and the right to remove the coal by strip mining are two separate
issues, and the question of surface use does not become a factor until
ownership of the minerals is established. By analogy these cases support the
theory that when there are no alternative means of removal, strip mining is
within the mineral estate owner's right to a reasonably necessary use of the
surface estate. They are, therefore, relevant to demonstrate the illogical
nature of the court's decisions in Acker and Williford which held that
removal of the substance leading to destruction of the surface required
ownership of the substance be given to the surface estate owner.
IV. WHO SHOULD GET THE COAL?
The previously discussed tests suggest that coal should pass under a




conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals." Coal certainly falls within the
category of "minerals" as determined by the vernacular of the mining
industry, the commercial world, and the landowners at the time of the grant.
As long ago as 1923 the Texas Supreme Court held that oil and gas are
minerals "in like manner and to the same extent as is coal or any other solid
mineral."' 130 An application of Cain v. Neumann'31 which held the
minerals included in the estate need not have been contemplated or even
discovered at the time of the grant would undoubtedly include coal in "other
minerals." Coal unquestionably possesses an exceptional characteristic or
peculiar property giving it a special value apart from the surface itself,
especially when its unique value as an alternative energy resource is
considered. 132 As previously stated, coal can be found from zero to two
hundred feet below the surface. It is rarely found in outcroppings above the
surface and has never been traditionally associated with surface ownership or
as essential to the utilization of the surface. The Waco court of civil appeals
in Williford v. Spies, however, suggested that these tests were outweighed by
the fact that the coal could only be removed by surface mining which would
result in the total destruction of the surface estate. 133 This case depended
solely on Acker v. Guinn for its support.' 3 4 It is submitted that both the
reasoning behind the surface destruction theory and the reasoning of the
court in Williford are illogical. In both Acker and Williford the court's
reasoning is faulty in one specific area. Since the parties had not expressed
any specific intent regarding the particular substance in question (coal), it is
only logical that the objective of the court would be to effectuate the general
intent derived from the conveyance. This general intent is the severance of
the mineral and surface estates. Since the two estates may be severed,
distinctly different means of enjoyment are contemplated to accompany each
estate. The mineral estate is to be enjoyed through the extraction of
valuable substances, and the surface estate by a retention and use of all
substances necessary for any enjoyment and use to which the surface is
adaptable. The supreme court's requirement of an expression of affirmative
intent relative to the inclusion of a substance that requires destructive
removal is not, however, a test of general intent based on the enjoyment of
the estates. The problem with the court's search for a specific intent is that
it results in passing to the surface owner those valuable substances which
would cause the destruction of the surface when removed by the only
profitable means known. The court is thus allowing the surface estate to
retain part of what was granted or reserved to the mineral estate.' 3 5 This
130. Stephens County v. Mid Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 167, 254 S.W.
290, 292 (1923).
131. 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. The peculiar value of coal may be greater than many people realize for it is
possible that Texas lignite may contain uranium, an element capable of boosting its eco-
nomic and energy-producing potential. See Lignite, Rebirth of a Texas Resource, 2
TEXAs ENERGY & MINERAL RESOURCES, Dec. 1975, at 2.
133. 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
134. Id.
135. Based upon this reasoning, if a valuable mineral is discovered, such as uranium,
which may only be extracted by a quarrying process resulting in the destruction of the
surface, then the surface owner could rightfully possess it. However, the court in Cain
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result is not only unjust but erroneous, for any particular method of
extraction in the minds of the parties at the time of the severance exists as a
result of observation and experience and not for the purpose of limiting the
substances which the owner may enjoy as part of his estate. 13 6 As a result
of an enthusiasm to protect the surface estate from any damage, the court
has conferred upon the surface owner a valuable mineral deposit and left the
mineral owner with nothing. 13 7  The surface owner could thereby extract
the valuable substance and market it for his own benefit, a result totally in
conflict with what the parties intended. Problems with the destruction of the
surface test might have been foreseen by. the Texas Supreme Court in
Heinatz v. Allen, an opinion which warned other courts not to use the test as
a decisive factor for interpreting the meaning of "minerals.' 138 Obviously
the Acker and Williford courts failed to heed this warning.' 3 9
The Williford court relied principally upon the Acker decision to hold that a
reservation of "oil, gas, and other minerals" did not include coal since the
extraction of coal would result in the destruction of the surface. There are
several strong grounds for distinguishing the factual situation in Acker from
that in the Williford case. Acker dealt with iron ore, a substance that was
primarily used as a foundation base in road construction although it had at
times been used to supplement the manufacture of pig iron. The court
based its decision on other cases that had held limestone, building stone, and
clay were not included within the term "other minerals."' 40  The Texas
Supreme Court has even explicitly restricted the holding in Acker v. Guinn
to specific quasi-minerals.' 4 ' Coal is obviously different from these quasi-
minerals in its nature, its use, and its unusual value. The iron ore in Acker
was found outcropping in many places. This location of the ore, therefore,
caused the substance to become a part of the surface estate.' 42 On the other
v. Neumann refused to follow this reasoning. 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-
tonio 1958, no writ).
136. The court in Acker v. Guinn seems to be using this knowledge of the grantor
to limit his intent by the statement, "the parties to a mineral lease or deed usually think
of the mineral estate as including valuable substances that are removed from the ground
by means of mines or well shafts." 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). See Comment,
supra note 15, at 415.
137. This is based upon the assumption that the coal is the only valuable substance
found on the particular mineral estate involved. Even when other minerals are present,
this is a very great diminution in the value of the mineral estate when coal is given
to the surface owner, resulting in just as an inequitable result as if coal were the only
mineral present.
138. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949). These problems and conflicts are a re-
sult of the illogical reasoning behind the destruction of the surface test, which allows
the means of extracting the substance to determine the ownership of that substance.
The question over the right to strip mine should not even be considered until after the
ownership of the substance is determined.
139. Had the courts in Acker and Williford treated the surface destruction test on
the same plane as the other considerations, such as unique value and proximity to the
surface, brought out in Heinatz, the result would probably have been very different.
140. The Acker court cited the Heinatz v. Allen and Atwood v. Rodman cases for
support that a devise of "mineral rights" did not include limestone and building stone.
141. In Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 866-67 (Tex. 1973),
the court, citing Acker as support, states, "[w]hen closely related to the surface itself,
gravel and limestone and even iron ore have been held not to be embraced by mineral
ownership."
142. This point was strongly emphasized by Professor William J. Flittie, editor of the
second edition of Summers on Oil and Gas, as distinguishing the Acker case from cases
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hand, the.coal in Williford was found at depths of fifty feet or more. 143
The reservation involved in Williford stated grantors retained "[o]ne half
(1/2) of all minerals, oil, gas and other minerals in and to and under the
above described property herein conveyed.' x44 The reservation has been
interpreted as saying all minerals-all oil, all gas, and all other minerals. 1 45
The broad sweep of the word "all" has persuaded some courts to include all
known mineral substances in the grant or reservation.' 4  This court,
however, gave no recognition to this point. There was also evidence that the
surface of the land in question had not been destroyed or substantially
impaired for agricultural or grazing purposes but that the land had actually
been somewhat improved. This evidence was obviously not persuasive to
the court.
Another problem is inherent in the destruction of the surface test. If new
mining processes are developed or coal is found in a geologic formation
conducive to underground mining, the reasoning of Williford suggests that
the coal would be a part of the mineral estate. Even though the means of
extraction and not the inherent nature of the coal has changed, the coal will
become a part of an entirely different estate. Such a result perpetuates
confusion and lack of uniformity in this area.
An irreconcilable conflict arises when Williford is considered with the
three major cases dealing with the right of the mineral owner to use the
surface estate. 147  It is ironic that the Waco court of civil appeals, after
deciding in Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 'Co.'4s that the owner of the
mineral estate was not liable in damages to the surface owner for a three-
foot subsidence resulting from the only known mining process, would fifteen
years later deprive the mineral owner of the very essence of his estate
because damage to the surface would result from the only available mining
process.
involving coal. Interview with William J. Flittie, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University School of Law, in Dallas, Texas, Jan. 12, 1976.
143. 530 S.W.2d at 129.
144. Id. at 128.
145. See New Mexico & Ariz. Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956),
where, regarding a conveyance of "all oil, gas and minerals underlying or appurtenant
to the said lands," the court stated: "The first word 'all,' describes the word 'oil,' the
word 'gas,' and the word 'minerals,' and encompasses all minerals, including, specifically,
uranium and thorium." Id. at 773. See also Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543(N.D. 1973).
146. See MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957), where, concerning a
lease granting the privilege of mining for oil, gas, and "all other minerals," the court
stated:
We do think there is significance in the fact the lease authorized the
lessee to produce not simply oil and gas and other minerals but oil and gas
and all other minerals. No word is more inclusive than 'all' and it is dif-
ficult to see why, if the parties intended a restricted construction to be
placed upon the reference to other minerals, they should use a word so
completely unrestricted in its meaning.
Id. at 41.
147. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones,
470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971); Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ ref'd).




The Williford case also conflicts with both Getty' 49 and Sun. 150 Both
cases stressed the implied right of the mineral estate owner to use as much of
the surface premises as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
mineral ownership with due regard for the rights of the owner of the surface
estate. The underlying theme of both cases and the explicit holding in Sun
was that the existing method fitted within the standard of "being reasonably
necessary with due regard to the surface owner" when no alternative method
of developing the mined resources existed. When no available alternative
means of extracting the valuable substances of the mineral estate exist,
surface mining can be considered, therefore, a reasonably necessary use of
the surface by the mineral estate. 151 The court in Sun expressly held that
such a grant was implied by law in all conveyances of a mineral estate and
could not be altered by evidence that the parties to a particular instrument of
conveyance did not intend the legal consequences of the grant unless an
express limitation on the grant was stated in the conveyance. 152  When
viewed with respect to these principles, it is difficult to understand how the
court in Williford could reason that the mineral estate owner did not have
the rights to the coal because its extraction resulted in damage to the surface.
These two cases expressly give the mineral owner the right to use the surface
in any manner necessary for the removal of the minerals when no alternative
method is available. 153
The advent of the new Surface Mining and Reclamation Act,' 54 the
several accounts of successful reclamation projects, 155 and the fact that the
surface mining area in East Texas is particularly conducive to reclamation
efforts' 56 all suggest the court's statement in (Williford that the surface
mining of coal would lead to total destruction of the surface estate is
exaggerated. The surface estate would, of course, be monopolized by the
activities of the mineral estate owner during the mining and reclamation
process, but surely this would fall within the standard of a reasonably
necessary use by the mineral owner. What more than a restoration of an
area affected by a surface mining operation to its original or other substan-
tially beneficial condition could fall within the standard of "use with due
regard to the surface owner"? An analogy to this situation can be drawn to
a case in North Dakota,' 57 a state with a reclamation statute' 58 very similar
149. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
150. 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
151. This theory is even strengthened when considered in light of the previously dis-
cussed Surface Mining Reclamation Act in Texas, putting upon the mining operator the
obligation to restore the land to its prior condition and use or at least the equivalent
thereof. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-10 (Supp. 1975-76).
152. 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
153. The only means of resolving this conflict is by reading Williford as saying the
recipient of a conveyance or reservation of "oil, gas, and other minerals" does not have
the full rights to the use of the surface as does the owner of the mineral estate created
in some clearer way. This reasoning collapses when coupled with the theory that the
general intent of the parties to a conveyance or reservation of "oil, gas, and other miner-
als" was to sever completely the mineral and surface estate.
154. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-10 (Supp. 1975-76).
155. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
156. See W. KAISER, supra note 2, at 31.
157. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
158. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-14-01 to -13 (1960 and Supp. 1969).
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to the Texas statute. The issue before the court in that case was whether a
reservation of all oil, gas, and other minerals in or under the land in question
included coal. Faced with the argument that coal should not be included
because strip mining would destroy the surface for agricultural purposes, the
court found coal includable because the North Dakota statute required
considerable regrading and replacement of topsoil. The court concluded
that the words "all oil, gas, and other minerals" were meant to include lignite
coal. 15 9
Certain policy considerations support the inclusion of coal in the mineral
estate formed by a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals." The basic
purpose for the dominance given the mineral estate owner is founded on the
view that dominance was the most equitable and practical way to develop
our natural resources. 160 The Texas Constitution states the public policy of
Texas as to its natural resources: "The conservation and development of all
of the natural resources of this State . . . are each and all hereby declared
public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may
be appropriate thereto."'' The efficient utilization of natural resources
should be a factor in any formulation of legal principles concerning minerals.
Efficient utilization presents a strong argument that coal should pass to the
mineral estate. A surface owner who receives ownership of coal under the
destruction of the surface theory has two alternatives. First, he may develop
the coal himself by granting a coal lease on the land and receiving royalties
upon its production. 162 As previously discussed, this is extremely inequita-
ble and probably contrary to the intention of the parties. The second
alternative is to forestall development of the coal and continue use of his
surface for grazing, farming, or the like. The value of the surface estate is
bound to rise with the increased demand for coal in the future. The present
energy crisis and the resulting need to develop coal as an alternative fuel
source make conduct under the second alternative against public policy as
contrary to the welfare of the nation. Accordingly, conduct of the surface
owner under either alternative will work a harsh injustice.'6 3 This injustice
is an inevitable result of the surface destruction test, a test which is both
illogical in its determination of a specific intent of the parties when none is
expressed and erroneous in its view of surface mining as a total destruction
of the surface estate.
159. 212 N.W.2d at 551. See also Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d
395 (Ky. Civ. App.-1968, writ ref'd), where the Kentucky Court of Appeals faced and
rejected the identical surface destruction argument in light of the Kentucky reclamation
statute, which is also very similar to the Texas statute. See KY. 'REV. STAT. ANN. ch.
350 (Baldwin Supp. 1965).
160. See Comment, A New Approach to the Use of the Surface Estate by a Lessee
Under an Oil and Gas Lease, 13 S. TEx. L.J. 269 (1972).
161. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
162. It is the opinion of this writer that, practically speaking, the majority of the sur-
face owners in East Texas are far more interested in the coal production royalties than
in the general aesthetics and beauty of the land. This is based upon the observation
that usually the East Texas land is far more valuable for its coal production than for
grazing or farming purposes.
163. For an excellent analysis of this problem, see Comment, The Meaning of "Mitt-
erals" in Grants and Reservations, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 343 (1958).
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR APPLICATION WHEN THE COAL DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS PLACES Too HARSH A BURDEN ON THE SURFACE OWNER
A dilemma is present whenever there is a reservation or conveyance of
"oil, gas, and other minerals." A presumed intent to sever the mineral and
surface estate in order to give the mineral estate owner the right to extract all
valuable substances from beneath the surface conflicts with an equally valid
presumption that the grantor intended to give the surface owner the right to
use the surface profitably. The conflict is rooted in the fact that extraction
by the mineral owner of certain valuable substances will temporarily injure
the surface owner's estate. A feasible solution to this dilemma may be a
slight variation of the proposal Professor Kuntz has advocated since 1949.164
Professor Kuntz finds inequity in the courts' attempts to give effect to an
intention to include or exclude a specific substance when actually the parties
had nothing specific in mind. He suggests that a court should arrive at a
general intent by considering the purposes of the grant or reservation in
terms of manner of enjoyment intended in the ensuing interests. When a
general grant or reservation is made of all minerals it should be assumed that
the parties intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the surface estate,
leaving the owner of each with definite incidents of ownership enjoyable in
distinctly different ways. Enjoyment of the surface estate requires the
retention of substances necessary for the use of the surface; enjoyment of the
mineral estate requires the extraction of valuable substances. Professor
Kuntz suggests that minerals whose extraction would cause significant dam-
age to the surface estate be deemed to belong to the mineral owner but that
he be bound to compensate the surface owner for damages to the surface
estate. Damages can be measured by the reduction in value of the land with
regard to surface use. This theory is fair to both mineral and surface estate
owners. The theory has been criticized, however, as leading to a forced sale
either of the surface if total destruction is involved, or of the minerals if
extraction is prohibited.
The Kuntz theory is certainly more equitable than the surface destruction
theory of Williford. The new reclamation statute, however, suggests that the
Kuntz theory be modified. The coal should continue under the Kuntz theory
to be deemed to belong to the mineral estate under a conveyance or reserva-
tion of "oil, gas, and other minerals." The right to extract the coal,
however, must be treated as a separate issue. Rather than passing owner-
ship of the coal to the surface owner under the Williford theory in order to
prevent destruction of the surface, ownership and extraction should be
treated separately. The right to extract the coal and compensate the surface
owner for diminution in value of the surface should not be automatic; there
should be a rebuttable presumption that the mineral owner has the right to
extract the coal. The mineral owner should be obligated to the surface
owner for the fair market rental value of the property from the time when
the mining starts to the time the reclamation of the surface is completed. The
164. See Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107
(1949). See also 1 E. KUNTZ, supra note 11, § 13.
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mineral owner should also be required to compensate the surface owner for
any diminution in value of the surface after reclamation is complete.' 65
Under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act the operator of a surface
mining operation is responsible for the total reclamation of the surface. 16
The tight of extraction presumption, therefore, can only be rebutted upon a
showing which satisfies the court that no possible means of a successful
reclamation exist. Upon such a showing the court will have two alternatives.
The court can either allow the mineral owner to extract the coal and
compensate the surface owner for the diminution in value of his surface
estate, or it can issue an injunction against the removal of the coal until such
time as technology develops a reclamation method that will allow extraction
of the coal without destroying the surface. The court is in the best position
to balance objectively the rights of the surface owner, the rights of the
mineral owner, and the public policy demands for the development of the
coal.
If the court grants the injunction of the surface owner, the coal may stand
undeveloped for what could be an extremely long period of time. There is
at least an even chance under present case law that the coal will be
developed, although the developer may be the surface owner.1 67 Issuance
of the injunction, however, is unlikely. The surface owner bears a strict
burden of proof that reclamation of the surface is impossible. 'Having met
this burden, the surface owner must convince the court that injury from
destruction of the surface is greater than injury to both the mineral owner
and the general public from allowing the coal to remain undeveloped. The
surface owner must show that a compensation award for the diminution in
value of the surface would be insufficient in any amount. Such a showing
would require exceptional circumstances; but the surface owner should at
least have some opportunity to plead his case and not automatically be
bound to what would amount to a forced sale of his property.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is genuine need to declare as a matter of law whether the term "oil,
gas, and other minerals" in an instrument severing the mineral estate
includes coal in the absence of contrary intrinsic evidence. Since parties
employing the term "oil, gas, and other minerals" usually have no subjective
intent concerning coal, an inquiry into the matter must be concerned with
judicially ascertained intent. Any attempt to determine subjective intent by
reference to "facts and circumstances then existing" of which adequate proof
has since disappeared would be unrealistic.
Declaring as a matter of law whether coal is included in a conveyance of
"oil, gas, and other minerals" can also promote exploration and development
165. This diminution in value should be determined by the court on a relative basis
of the value of the land prior to the mining as compared to the value of the land after
reclamation, whatever its use.
166. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-10 (Supp. 1975-76).
167. As previously stated, the surface owner could develop the coal and receive coal
production royalties or could just sit on the coal and forestall any development. See
notes 160-63 supra and accompanying text.
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of coal production. A case-by-case determination of whether coal is includ-
ed in a conveyance creates a risk few coal companies are willing to take. The
public interest connected with the development of natural resources is
persuasive that the term needs to have an established judicial interpretation.
The present interpretation of the Texas courts does not provide the needed
solution to the problem. Negative effects result from the courts' illogical
reasoning that the inclusion of coal in a reservation or grant of "oil, gas, and
other minerals" hinges upon the manner of extraction. The more logical
approach is to treat ownership and the right of extraction by surface mining
operations as separate questions. A rebuttable presumption that the mineral
owner has a right to surface mine the coal and an obligation on the part of
the mineral owner to compensate the surface owner both for the fair market
rental value of the land and for any diminution in value after the reclama-
tion process is complete would provide sufficiently equitable treatment and
protection of both estates. Whatever proposal is favored, however, the
Texas courts should strictly scrutinize the existing surface destruction test and
consider discarding it.
